SOVIET ADVOCACY AND THE U.S. MEDIA

A Report of the
United States
Advisory Commission
on Public Diplomacy

TO THE CONGRESS AND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

In accordance with Section 8, Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977 and Public Law 96-60, the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy submits herewith a report on *Soviet Advocacy and the U.S. Media*.

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A MESSAGE FROM THE CHAIRMAN

Democracies are built on the principle of the free flow of information, and we have come to enjoy the benefits generated: the free exchange of ideas, technological achievement, full enfranchisement of the citizenry, and intellectual excellence, to name just a few.

Yet we are confronted on a daily basis by an antithetical philosophy, promoted by the Soviet Union, which uses information as a controllable and malleable tool. Besides restricting the access of their own citizens to the full range of information and opinion, the Soviets exploit the openness of our system to promote their global agenda.

The United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy supports openness and full freedom of information as a fundamental component of democracy. At the same time, we do not believe that the present asymmetry in the exchange of information between the U.S. and the Soviet Union should be accepted by this country. Just as we should permit Vladimir Pozner, properly identified as a spokesman of the Soviet Government, to speak to the American people, the United States in turn should be permitted to bring its perspectives to the Soviet people on a regular and continuing basis. With few exceptions, that is not happening. We must pursue reciprocal access.

Americans must be more fully aware of the degree to which Soviet official spokesmen, many of them ostensibly "journalists," are able to expound their policies to our media and our public as though they were personal opinions. Although some of our recommendations relate to the U.S. news media and journalists' organizations, it is not our intention to undercut the fine reporting of Soviet-American issues that they accomplish under difficult circumstances, with limited resources, and under tight deadlines. It is simply to offer the Commission's long-range perspective on this critical issue.

Commissioner Priscilla Buckley and Deputy Staff Director Michael Morgan have prepared the following report, which gives timely focus to this issue. We appreciate the insights of officials of the U.S. Information Agency's Office of Research, Programs Bureau, the Foreign Press Center, the Office of European Affairs and the Voice of America. Their views have been invaluable in shaping the Commission's findings.

Our recommendations are normally presented in annual reports to the Congress and to the President. The Commission's enabling legislation, however, provides that it also submit "such other reports to the Congress as it deems appropriate." The challenge of intensified Soviet use of public diplomacy warrants our doing so at this time.

Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.
Chairman

October 1986

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

U.S.-SOVIET MEDIA RECIPROCITY

(1) The United States, in concert with other signatory nations, should continue to press the Soviet Union to honor Article 19 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states:

"Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers."

(2) The United States and the Western European signatories should continue to press the USSR to abide by its treaty commitment made in the 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Accords) to:

"...facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds, to encourage cooperation in the field of information and the exchange of information with other countries, and to improve the conditions under which journalists from one participating State exercise their profession in another participating State."

(3) The U.S. Embassy in Moscow, the State Department, and USIA should be receptive to U.S. journalists' complaints about the numbers, ease of entry, and treatment of U.S. journalists in the USSR and overall Soviet compliance with the relevant sections of the CSCE Final Act so that when deemed advisable and productive, appropriate actions can be taken with the Soviet Government.

(4) At the next U.S.-Soviet summit, and in the next round of educational and cultural exchanges negotiations, the United States should press for access to the Soviet media for official U.S. spokesmen, both through a general agreement for binational exchanges of such appearances, and through greater openness to case-by-case proposals.

(5) At the next summit, the President should suggest the creation of a "Joint U.S.-Soviet Task Force on Media Reciprocity" to examine means of increasing access of U.S. spokesmen, journalists and media products to the Soviet people. The U.S. also should examine new feasible, forceful reciprocal action against continued Soviet intransigence on the free flow of information.

(6) The United States should pursue as a higher priority more frequent entry by VOA reporters into the Soviet Union and the opening of a VOA bureau in Moscow. Soviet visa refusals should merit appropriate U.S. responses, such as reciprocal treatment of Radio Moscow correspondents in the United States.

(7) So long as the normal avenues of communication with the Soviet people remain obstructed, the United States should maximize other available opportunities such as cultural exchanges, exhibits, and continued intensive radio broadcasting through the Voice of America and Radio Liberty. The United States should continue to place pressure on the USSR to end jamming of U.S. and Western radio broadcasts.

ENHANCING U.S.-SOVIET MEDIA COVERAGE

(8) U.S. news organizations and television networks operating in Moscow should continue to push aggressively *in concert* for greater access to Soviet society and sources.

(9) Soviet spokesmen and journalists appearing on U.S. radio and television should be identified as spokesmen or as employees of the Soviet Government, and if known, their membership and position in the Soviet Communist Party mentioned. Their arguments, misstatements, evasions, and omissions should be challenged and refuted.

(10) The United States should give to Soviet Government radio, television, and print media authorities a list of American officials who are fluent in Russian and available to articulate American policies for Soviet media audiences.

(11) U.S. networks that frequently host and interview Soviet journalists should make available to Soviet officials, if asked, a list of American correspondents who are fluent in Russian and who could serve as commentators on American affairs and Soviet-American relations for Soviet media.

(12) In light of the accessibility of U.S. media to official Soviet spokesmen, and their increasing use of it to propound their views, the U.S. Government should make grants to private sector organizations for seminars on Soviet information strategy, the nature, role and objectives of the Soviet journalist, and related subjects.

(13) Private organizations such as the World Press Freedom Committee should undertake workshops conducted by U.S. journalists for Soviet correspondents resident in or covering the U.S. to explain the complexities of U.S. politics, economics, foreign policy, society and culture, in the hopes this would yield more accurate, objective and balanced reporting on the U.S. for Soviet audiences and readers.

(14) U.S. journalists' organizations such as the Standing Committee of Correspondents of the Congress should be aware that when they discriminate against Voice of America, USIA-TV, or USIA Wireless File reporters for being U.S. Government employees, this gives credibility to hypocritical Soviet Government discrimination against these reporters as well.

INTRODUCTION

In the year since Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, it has become apparent that the Soviet Union is using public diplomacy as never before. The Soviets have demonstrated a new sophistication in the way they deal with the Western media. The counterproductive tactics of the past—stonewalling, denial of undeniable fact, crude distortion of truth, and use of inept spokesmen—have in part given way to Western-style massaging of the media, skillful advocacy, and a new corps of Soviet spokesmen. They may be called "diplomats," "journalists" or "concerned physicians," but they are all increasingly wise in the ways of American television.

Why has this happened? It is the result of new Soviet leadership. Additionally, the Soviet Union is no longer an "information island." Its frontiers are ever more porous—whether from VOA or Radio Liberty broadcasts, clandestine video-cassettes, broader access to computer data, or *samizdat* reporting of suppressed news. The Soviets also have been forced to become more competent in the information field because the United States has put increasing emphasis on information and public diplomacy. Moreover, Soviet signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975 put them on record as favoring the free flow of information, and obliges them to respond to Western criticism of their failure to adhere to the Accords. And finally, as this Commission noted in its 1986 Report to the President, "...there is hardly a police state left that can ignore foreign public opinion...Put simply, instant global communications are breaking down rigidities and isolation, and public opinion is increasingly influential in shaping foreign policy."

This report will focus on three themes: 1) the role of Soviet journalists and other state representatives in advocating Soviet goals; 2) the virtually unlimited access that Soviet advocates and journalists have to the U.S. system, and the lack of corresponding access in the USSR by the U.S.; and 3) how reciprocity could be extended. In light of recent Soviet progress in public diplomacy, the Commission finds it imperative that a more balanced U.S.-Soviet information relationship be achieved as soon as possible.

The indictment in Moscow of U.S. reporter Nicholas Daniloff has been a sobering reminder of the vulnerability of Western correspondents to the power of the Soviet state. Mr. Daniloff's arrest is graphic evidence of the difference between U.S. and Soviet concepts of journalism. The Commission abhors this affront to the norms of civilized behavior.

We hope that this report will better inform American reporters, elected officials and private citizens about Soviet objectives, and underscore the need to continue pressing the Soviet Union to honor its Helsinki commitments.

The Commission fully understands media concerns about U.S. governmental interference. And nothing in this report should be read as seeking to undermine the role of a free and independent press in American society, and the guarantees of the First Amendment to the Constitution. We wish only to suggest ways the U.S. Government, U.S. journalists, and the American people might address the growing and one-sided presence of official Soviet spokesmen in the American media.

SOVIET JOURNALISTS AND OFFICIALS AS ADVOCATES

Observant Americans are now aware that some Soviet journalists, particularly those assigned to the U.S., and other Soviet spokesmen are appearing in the U.S. media as advocates for the policies of their government. This development, while recent in the U.S., has been underway in Western Europe for some time, and Soviet "commentators" have achieved a fairly respectable status with Western European audiences. U.S. attention to this phenomenon has been attracted by a new generation of Soviet journalist-advocates fluent in English, such as Radio Moscow commentator Vladimir Pozner and Aleksandr Palladin of *Izvestia*. Mr. Palladin dresses in "preppy" fashion and has a boyish charm; Mr. Pozner grew up in Brooklyn and speaks English like a native American. As Charles Lichtenstein, former Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations, has said:

"There is no question the Soviets are waking up to the fact they can take advantage of the Western media. They are more and more sophisticated in using the media. Five years ago, I don't remember seeing a Soviet spokesman on U.S. television, but now there are four or five on regularly. They are highly conversant with the West, they speak virtually flawless English, use anecdotes and analysis with just a bit of self-criticism to make themselves credible. It's all done with an extraordinary amount of skill. I'm just astonished it took them so long." [1]

Charles William Maynes, Editor of *Foreign Policy* magazine, recently stated:

"When I served in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in the late 1960s, the Soviets would never expose themselves to the unpredictability of television. They would use it and exploit it, but they would not take risks. Now they are taking risks. The change is due to a new generation of Soviet diplomats. Many of them are very sophisticated. They understand that if the Soviet Union wants to make headway in the world, they have to use the media. Compared to 1965, they've come many light years." [2]

According to some USIA officials, the arrival of these commentators in the West should be seen as part of a larger Soviet strategy to promote the "perception of equivalence" between the USSR and the United States. Articulate representatives of the USSR seek to tell Western audiences that the "new" Soviet Union is not much different from the West. This has special implications in Western Europe, where if successful it promotes neutralism (and detachment from the U.S.) by suggesting to Europeans they are caught between two identical superpowers, rather than one which wishes to defend their democratic freedoms and the other which would seek to dominate them. In the U.S., the Soviet intent is to undermine popular support for defense

[1] *National Journal*, 12/14/85, p. 2861.
[2] *National Journal*, 12/14/85, p. 2861.

enhancement policies and to strengthen the peace movement.

Although Soviet advocates seek most often to use television to shape U.S. public opinion, they also author guest editorials; they write letters to the editor; if they are articulate they are sought out for newspaper or magazine interviews; and failing all of the above, they can take out full-page advertisements in papers like *The New York Times*. None of these avenues is routinely open to U.S. spokesmen in the USSR, of course. During the last two years there have been dozens of such Soviet appearances in the U.S. media.[3] These journalists and spokesmen are uncritical of their government on substantive policy matters. There has been some recent superficial criticism of Soviet policies, particularly by Vladimir Pozner (in his "personal view" the USSR should allow Jews and others to emigrate so long as they are not "security risks," etc.) which seems to be intended to enhance his credibility with skeptical American audiences. Other non-journalist Soviet officials have had no trouble achieving easy access to U.S. media, ranging from Mikhail Gorbachev himself in his famous pre-summit *Time* magazine interview, to Soviet cardiologist Yevgeniy Chazov, a full member of the CPSU Central Committee, 1985 Nobel Peace Prize Winner, and co-chairman of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. Soviet spokesmen also engage in public speaking at U.S. universities and other fora.

American television viewers are usually unaware of the official and party links of the individuals who are introduced by their apparent profession, such as "commentator" Vladimir Pozner or "concerned physician" Chazov. American audiences are ill-served by the fact that U.S. television anchors and reporters are not Sovietologists and seem less aggressive in pursuing misstatements, distortions, or falsehoods by Soviet advocates than they are with American officials, whose every statement is closely scrutinized.

Soviet journalists in the "front line" of the ideological struggle with capitalism are virtually all Communist Party members. Many leading Soviet editors and directors are full or candidate members of the CPSU Central Committee. Although this does not necessarily reflect heartfelt ideological zeal, it does mean a rigid conformity to Party views as a means to career advancement, which carries with it important perquisites: foreign imports, state-provided dachas, foreign travel and the best schools for their offspring. They are expected to adhere to well-known standards of "Party-mindedness."

Americans may be surprised to learn that the Soviet journalists and spokesmen they see on U.S. television are so tightly integrated into the Communist Party leadership structure. Novelist Yulian Semyonov, whom Marvin Kalb hosted on a November 17, 1985 NBC "Meet the Press," also reportedly served as ghostwriter for his father-in-law S.K. Tsvigun, who was First Deputy Chairman of the KGB from 1967-1982.[4] Additionally, Gennadii Gerasimov, who, when Editor-in-Chief of *Moscow News* appeared as a guest commentator on ABC "World News Tonight" (11/18/85), has also served a two-year stint on the Communist Party Central Committee. He is now chief of the Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Soviet diplomat defector Arkady Shevchenko charged that Mr. Gerasimov is a KGB agent. Significantly, none of these government-party affiliations were mentioned to American television viewers.

U.S. spokesmen and journalists have no parallel access to Soviet media. Soviet officials reply that Soviet spokesmen appearing on U.S. television are sought out by the U.S. networks, not vice versa, so if Soviet media choose not to invite American spokesmen, that is their right. Furthermore, coming from the U.S. with its tradition of an adversarial press, few U.S. journalists would wish to appear in the Soviet media as advocates for U.S. policies or values, since they see their role as narrow and specific: that of newsgatherers alone. Some U.S. "journalists" do appear in Soviet media, but either they are from such publications as the U.S. Communist Party *People's World* or they are mainstream American journalists opposed to specific U.S. policies.

During negotiations for the Cultural Agreement signed at the Geneva Summit, the U.S. side proposed language calling for six television appearances each by Soviet and U.S. officials on the other country's TV screens, but the proposition got nowhere. The Soviets will consider such appearances on a case-by-case basis only. The Commission recommends that at the next U.S.-Soviet summit, and in the next round of educational and cultural exchanges negotiations, the United States should press for access to the Soviet media for official U.S. spokesmen, both through a general agreement for binational exchanges of such appearances, and through greater openness to case-by-case proposals.

THE NATURE OF SOVIET JOURNALISM AND INFORMATION

STATE OWNERSHIP/ IDEOLOGICAL CONTROLS

Soviet journalists are employed in a nominal sense by thousands of organizations, ranging from well-known ones like Tass (the international Soviet Government wire service), Novosti (the Soviet international feature service), *Pravda* (the daily newspaper of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), and *Izvestia* (the Soviet Government daily newspaper), to lesser publications in trade and professional fields. But Soviet journalists are all employees of the Soviet state. All press organs fall under the policy guidance of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the single "legal" political party. Supervision of the media begins at the highest levels of the CPSU Central Committee on which sit editors and directors of all the major Soviet media organs. It ranges down to the editorial and working level of all Soviet publications. And within the media organs themselves, each layer of production is further infused

[3] USIA's Research Division undertook a survey covering the period 1983-85; see Appendix B.

[4] *TV Guide*, 4/26/86, p. 3.

with ideological supervision, for each has its own Communist Party cells which further shape the product.

NO PRESS FREEDOM

State ownership of media outlets does not necessarily mean the media will be the mouthpiece of government in societies where freedom of speech and the press is constitutionally and traditionally respected (the BBC, for example). In the case of the Soviet Union, however, where the concept of an independent press does not exist either in practice or in law, journalists are required to advocate policies decided by higher party authorities, and be supportive of Marxist-Leninist theory, including belief in the class struggle and the inevitable victory of communism over capitalism. Article 25 of the Soviet Constitution guarantees freedom of the press only to the extent that it is used "in conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to strengthen the socialist system." Whereas a Western journalist strives towards objectivity, and tries to describe reality in all its ambiguity and complexity, the Soviet journalist consciously seeks, through the selective use of information of varying degrees of truthfulness, to manipulate the reader into support of policies or objectives decided by a higher authority: the Communist Party.

E. P. Prokhorov says of Soviet journalism, ***"The Marxist-Leninist theory of journalism proceeds upon the premise that a truly objective picture of reality that can give reliable social information for the masses...can be provided only by a journalism that adheres to a communist party point of view...Under the leadership of the communist and workers' parties, Marxist journalism carries on propaganda, agitation, and organizational activity corresponding to the fundamental interests of the working people..."*** [5]

More recently, Egor Ligachev, the second most powerful Communist Party leader after General Secretary Gorbachev who has oversight over propaganda and information, said ***"All television and radio programs must be subordinated to one aim—explaining and implementing [Communist] Party policy."*** [6]

DIFFERING U.S. AND SOVIET MEDIA ROLES

The differing roles of U.S. and Soviet journalists were recently discussed at the New York University Center for War, Peace, and the News Media, which brought Soviet officials and journalists together with U.S. and European journalists and editors. The group quickly demonstrated how different are Soviet and Western media. Participants quickly discovered the essential incompatibility of the two systems. NBC News President Lawrence Grossman noted that U.S. and Soviet "definitions" of journalism are different. He said that the Soviet press is the "spokesman for the government," and that it is "impossible" to get at the truth when government controls the press. The Soviet participants, on the other hand, looked upon journalists as activists. Journalists should "strengthen the spirit of Geneva" and "create a climate of trust so summits can succeed" (Leonid Kravchenko, First Deputy Chairman of Gosteleradio, the Soviet State Committee for Television and Radio). They should show their readers how "the creation of nuclear weapons has betrayed our world" (Alexander Bovin, commentator for *Izvestia* and Gosteleradio). They should "stop fanning the flames of 'Star Wars' " (Mikhail Bruk, Special Correspondent for Novosti). They are "like tailors... they can embellish a man, or make him uglier" (Vladimir Molchanov, Special Correspondent for Novosti).

Participating U.S. journalists refused to assume any such role. As David Ignatius, Associate Editor of *The Washington Post* said, "Our role is not to control or shape opinion; it is simply to inform." Or in the words of Gerd Ruge, Editor-in-Chief of Westdeutscher Rundfunk (the West German Television Network), the purpose of journalism is to "give the public as much information as possible" about a subject.

SIGNS OF SOVIET CHANGE

During the past year, some Westerners have been heartened by calls for a new spirit of *glasnost'* (candor, openness, publicity) by General Secretary Gorbachev. The Chernobyl nuclear disaster has shown the uncertainty and unevenness with which the "new openness" is being implemented. First Soviet official and journalistic reactions to the disaster were traditional. They tried to suppress the story to avoid international embarrassment, then to divert blame and hide behind stale accounts of the U.S. Three Mile Island accident; they accused the Western press of using the accident as a pretext for "whipping up anti-Soviet hysteria," and domestically, suppressed the news to "prevent panic."

Yet there followed domestic Soviet coverage of Chernobyl that was unprecedented for a state that traditionally hides natural and man-made disasters. That a post-Chernobyl press conference was given at all, no matter how restricted, and that the General Secretary gave a televised speech on the matter, no matter how delayed and incomplete, showed that worldwide information trends are having an impact on Soviet society.

There are other signs of change. The USSR is experimenting with new "Nightline"-style and audience-response programs, which do allow for some criticism of domestic matters. One program is a journalist roundtable that permits occasional differing viewpoints. The other is a call-in program resembling a much-publicized program in Hungary that takes officials to task for bureaucratic failures. Soviet journalist "raiders" (given a higher Party level go-ahead) sometimes descend on institutions and organizations seeking to rectify mismanagement. Soviet publications carry "Letters to the Editor" from Soviet citizens complaining about specific domestic problems. While this avenue has long been off-limits to U.S. spokesmen

[5] *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, Third Edition, p. 298.
[6] *U.S. News and World Report*, 6/9/86, p. 35.

in Moscow, in early June, *Pravda* carried a letter from U.S. Chargé Richard E. Combs, Jr. criticizing the Soviet reprinting of unverified charges that the CIA had been involved in the bombing of the West Berlin discotheque earlier this year. To be sure, *Pravda* followed the text of the letter with a vigorous anti-U.S. rebuttal. Two weeks earlier *Pravda* had carried another letter from a West German diplomat. The Soviet Government uses this means of advocacy in the U.S. quite routinely, whether it be in *The New York Times* or *The Washington Post*, or any other organ it chooses.

The press conference is another recent Soviet innovation. Whereas Soviet press conferences usually rely on written questions and frequently do not take questions from foreign journalists, nonetheless they are not absolutely controllable, especially in foreign settings. Soviet viewers saw French journalists asking General Secretary Gorbachev taboo questions about political prisoners in the USSR during Gorbachev's pre-summit visit to France. Former Foreign Ministry spokesman Leonid Zamiatin was so unsettled at a pre-summit press conference in Geneva by harsh questions from a Soviet dissident-exile that he reflexively called for the "militia" to take her away.

Soviet television is the most tightly-controlled medium, probably because it is the most influential shaper of opinions and its two national networks are easy to control. Soviet print media is possibly less so. At times new ideas, always sanctioned by a Party authority, can be floated in print. Analysts are waiting to see whether *glasnost'* seeps into the sacrosanct coverage of foreign affairs, where any divergence from the Party line is forbidden. For example, a Radio Moscow announcer who earlier this decade called the Soviet action in Afghanistan an "invasion" was summarily removed and sent away for psychiatric observation. Surprisingly, *Pravda* complained in a May commentary that "Information about the capitalist world is monotonous... journalistic cliches migrate from broadcast to broadcast." [7] And finally, the pre-summit interview with President Reagan in *Izvestia* last year, the President's New Year's Day appearance on Soviet television, and the fact that several frequencies of the Voice of America carrying President Reagan's pre-summit speech to the Soviet people were not jammed, do indicate at least some liberalization of information.

One cannot underrate the impact of Western broadcasts to the USSR, such as Voice of America and Radio Liberty, in compelling a new Soviet openness. Chernobyl is only the most recent demonstration of this influence. Soviet exiles Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova claim that not only do many Soviet citizens depend on Western broadcasts to find out the truth; so too does the Soviet elite. According to Solovyov, the Moscow suburb of Zavidovo, where many officials maintain dachas, is not jammed so the leadership can keep abreast of world affairs, and even of political events within the USSR that are not reported.[8]

SOVIET COVERAGE OF THE U.S.

Soviet journalists must write stories that support or confirm officially-decreed Communist Party and Soviet Government perceptions of the U.S., its society and foreign policy. Almost without exception, those decreed perceptions are negative.

American policies executed by the "elite" are characterized as "militaristic," "imperialistic," "rapacious," "anti-democratic," "racist," "genocidal" and so on. Soviet articles and television features about the U.S. are written both by writers in the USSR and correspondents assigned to the United States. Current Soviet media preoccupations include the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and arms control in general, the summit process, the plight of the U.S. homeless and ethnic minorities, and U.S. "militarism" in Central America and Libya. Many of the topics are gleaned from domestic American news sources. But Soviet reporters are not above fabricating or embellishing stories that criticize the United States. Soviet media have depicted American Indian activist and convicted murderer Leonard Peltier as an American "political prisoner." To defuse Chernobyl criticism, commentaries were run on alleged risks of continued U.S. nuclear testing in Nevada.

Appearances by Americans are not unknown in the Soviet media. However, these individuals, ranging from American radicals like Angela Davis to well-known Americans like Dr. Billy Graham to tourists interviewed on the streets of Moscow, are always quoted either to condemn some aspect of the United States or its policies, or to espouse positions in tune with Soviet positions. American criticism of aspects of Soviet society or of Soviet Government policies or institutions never appears in the Soviet press. Soviet coverage of the U.S. has been no more favorable since the Geneva Summit than before, according to USIA officials who monitor Soviet pronouncements. The only change has been a diminution of personal attacks on President Reagan. But rhetoric and invective against the U.S. by such organs as Radio Moscow, Tass and *Pravda* have been as profuse and harsh as ever. To the standard stable of anti-American charges has been added a new one: the United States with its assorted policies is "violating the Spirit of Geneva."

SOVIET JOURNALISTS IN THE U.S.

Soviet journalists are presently located in Washington, New York and San Francisco; by choice, U.S. journalists are resident only in Moscow. In Washington, Tass, *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, and Soviet Radio and Television (Gosteleradio) are represented by 12 correspondents. In New York, six reporters represent *Izvestia*, *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, *Moscow News*, *New Times*, and Novosti. Tass has two correspondents in San Francisco.

Washington-based Soviet reporters, as might be expected, are primarily interested in politico-military issues. New York coverage tends to be more cultural, with focus on "Americana." Science and technology are also of interest,

[7] *U.S. News and World Report*, 6/9/86, p. 36.
[8] *Christian Science Monitor*, 6/19/86, p. 15.

whereas economics get surprisingly little coverage.

The numbers of Soviet reporters in the U.S. are held to specific limits by the Department of State through issuance of visas to correspond to limits set by Soviet authorities on U.S. journalists entering the USSR. Similar limits are not imposed on reporters from other Soviet bloc countries or Cuba, however. Soviet journalists must request permission from the State Department to travel more than 25 miles from the center of their city of residence only because the USSR has imposed those same limits on American reporters. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow is advised if a Soviet journalist requests to cover a story beyond those limits, and if it approves, the request is granted. That instance is then used by the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to request similar treatment for U.S. journalists by Soviet authorities.

The principle of numerical and geographical reciprocity is closely followed. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow closely tracks the treatment of U.S. journalists in the USSR. When U.S. journalists are harassed or their rights abridged, the U.S. Government may retaliate against Soviet journalists based in the U.S. But all too often, the U.S. media organization whose representative was attacked by Soviet authorities may urge the U.S. Government not to retaliate for fear of jeopardizing its own access in Moscow and falling behind its American competitors. In Washington, Soviet journalists find themselves in the heart of what is probably the most open world capital in terms of information, especially on sensitive subjects like defense, foreign policy and politics. While American journalists in Moscow contend with nearly inaccessible officialdom as well as all the other limitations of a closed society, Soviet journalists in Washington are flooded with information. They have White House, State Department and Congressional press passes. They can attend the twice-daily White House briefings, the daily noon briefing at the State Department or a weekly briefing at the USIA Foreign Press Center. They can attend open Congressional hearings on any issue, including the Strategic Defense Initiative, the B-1 bomber or security assistance to Israel. They can read our technical and specialized journals. They can simply pick up the phone and request an interview with anyone they wish. They are the beneficiaries of a free and open society. If a Soviet correspondent wishes to find credible and factual critiques of current U.S. Government policy in fields like foreign affairs or defense, he or she need go no further than any of the thousands of U.S. publications that, exercising their freedom of speech, deal with those issues. He can simply quote from insightful editorials in mainstream or partisan U.S. publications. This is a common Soviet journalistic technique, a skillful use of the openness of U.S. society to condemn U.S. society.

Soviet journalists also have access to such unprecedented tools as the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) which can provide them with unclassified details of U.S. Government operations. This law has no parallel in the USSR, nor even in many Western democracies. There are no data presently available to show how heavily FOIA is actually used by Soviet journalists or third parties working on their behalf.

U.S. officials are not agreed whether the presence of Soviet journalists, with such dubious roles and orientations, is a net loss or gain for the United States. The downside is obvious. But there is another side. Some USIA officials believe having Soviet journalists in the U.S. foreign press corps exposes some of the best non-Soviet bloc young foreign journalists to the Soviets early on, and shows how they work. They point to the Tass correspondent who covered the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics. The Tass reporter, following ideological guidance from Moscow (which of course boycotted the Olympics), wrote lengthy and turgid polemics about alleged snafus in the Games and the "dangers" of Los Angeles. Biased and inaccurate, they became a comic relief to the foreign press corps covering the Olympics. "It was," remarked an American observer on the scene, "as if he were reporting other games in another city."

Having Soviet journalists in the U.S. is also an educational experience for the Soviets, exposing them to ideas and experiences they would not have otherwise. For the younger ones, the experience of being in an open, democratic society can certainly not be underrated, nor can the opportunity to measure for themselves the divergence between the reality of the U.S. and what they have been told about the U.S. by the Soviet Government.

U.S. JOURNALISTS IN THE USSR

U.S. journalists in the Soviet Union confront the omnipotent state at every turn. Aside from travel restrictions, there are other tools of harassment if they step out of line, from the withholding of access to expulsion to, as in the Daniloff case, spurious charges of espionage. Topics such as military matters are taboo; others such as political machinations among the Party leadership must be divined by analyzing seating arrangements at public ceremonies. The American journalist is further challenged by the fact that very few Soviet citizens will risk losing whatever privileges they may have by speaking forthrightly about sensitive matters, particularly to an American reporter. Whether they be scientists, government officials or factory workers, any Soviet citizen knows criticism of his or her society to a foreign journalist could result in loss of Party membership, loss of job and privileges, loss of access by his or her children to educational opportunities and employment, possible commitment to psychiatric care, and even criminal charges. Those willing to speak forthrightly are those who have nothing to lose, such as dissidents and refuseniks. American reporters have little hope of gleaning objective insights into Soviet society by following the totally controlled Soviet press; the underground *samizdat* press is an alternative, but its clandestine and sporadic nature limits its usefulness.

American news organizations covering the USSR are placed at a further disadvantage vis-a-vis the Soviet Government by the intramural competition. Network ratings

depend in part on "scoops" and "exclusives" which in the USSR almost invariably originate from an official source. This makes it important for individual U.S. media organizations to stay on the good side of Soviet officialdom, and consequently they are reluctant to urge the U.S. Government to seek a hard tit-for-tat in maintaining reciprocity.

American journalists in the USSR also face a normal impediment that faces all foreign correspondents: working with a foreign language. Many—particularly U.S. television correspondents—do not speak Russian because their tenure in Moscow is limited and preparation for the assignment is often not as rigorous or as long as the training of print journalists. Those Americans who don't speak Russian must rely on interpreters supplied by the Soviet Government, whose presence will certainly inhibit statements by interviewees. Additionally, American correspondents are usually assigned housing in a compound reserved for foreigners, so they will be further isolated from Soviet citizens. Newly-arrived journalists, and veterans for that matter, may find it difficult to break out of the limits of press conferences and requests for interviews that must be cleared by the relevant organization with whom the prospective interviewee is affiliated.

According to a journalist who served in Moscow, U.S. reporters normally go through several phases during their Moscow tenure. Upon arrival, they are generally well-treated, and are granted high-level interviews, but as time passes, the journalist's access diminishes, particularly as the Soviet Government becomes aware of the unfavorable stories. Outgoing stories, be it noted, are not censored by the Soviet Government. In the final months in the USSR the American journalist, if he or she has been perceived as obstreperous, runs the risks of being entrapped in a contrived illegal situation such as public drunkenness, an alleged black market transaction or being smeared in the local press, which could serve as the pretext for his expulsion if that is the way Soviet authorities want to play it.

VOICE OF AMERICA (VOA) REPORTERS IN THE USSR

The Voice of America has had a particularly difficult time in recent years getting accredited VOA News Division and language service correspondents into the Soviet Union. (There are no Radio Moscow correspondents permanently stationed in the U.S., but Radio Moscow is part of Gosteleradio, which has four U.S.-based correspondents.) The BBC has long maintained a bureau in Moscow, but apparently the United States has never pursued opening a VOA bureau there. The Commission believes the U.S. Government should consider seeking to open such a bureau.

Although there has never been a permanent VOA bureau in Moscow, VOA officials say that in 1973-1978 Soviet visas for traveling VOA correspondents were more easily obtained. During this period there was no jamming of VOA signals into the USSR. But by 1980, with the deterioration in relations brought on by the invasion of Afghanistan, visa requests were turned down routinely. VOA correspondents were given accreditation for the 1980 Olympics, but no visas were issued in time to cover the event.

In 1986, some News Division correspondents have been able to get visas for "familiarization visits" but not for journalistic assignments to the USSR. Others have been admitted, but only when accompanying a U.S. cabinet-level official (Vice President Bush, Secretary of State Shultz, Agriculture Secretary Block) on visits to the USSR. Turndown for coverage of the Communist Party congresses appears to be longstanding, and was repeated in 1986.

Following State Department pressure, the Soviets approved visa requests by one VOA News Division and three language service (Russian, Czechoslovak, Arabic) correspondents to cover the 1986 Goodwill Games, organized in large part by U.S. media executive Ted Turner. The Soviets subsequently approved a visa request for one VOA Russian language service reporter to cover the Tchaikovsky Competition. Whether this represents a liberalization of entry policy for VOA cannot yet be determined. VOA officials seek to have a protest made each time a VOA visa request is turned down; the State Department determines how best to lodge this protest. State Department control over visas for Soviet Communist Party members has been sharply curtailed by the McGovern Amendment to the Immigration and Naturalization Act which makes U.S. Government action against Soviet spokesmen (as opposed to resident correspondents) more difficult. This legislation requires visa denials for Soviet (and all other non-U.S. Communist Party members) to be based on national security grounds alone.

Ironically, another obstacle facing VOA correspondents exists here in the United States. The Standing Committee of Correspondents in the U.S. Congress is currently pressuring its members not to accept honoraria for appearing as moderators or as participants on VOA and USIA's WORLDNET satellite TV programs. This narrow-minded approach is especially perplexing to this Commission, which campaigned successfully to have VOA correspondents accredited to cover the U.S. Congress, an accreditation that came many years too late. It is likewise puzzling in view of the VOA Charter, signed into law in 1976, which says, "VOA will serve as a consistently reliable and authoritative source of news. VOA news will be accurate, objective, and comprehensive. VOA will represent America, not any single segment of American society, and will therefore present a balanced and comprehensive projection of significant American thought and institutions."

Unfortunately, the fact that some U.S. journalists and media organizations perceive VOA and by extension USIA's Wireless File and WORLDNET Service, to be tainted by its government ownership has been hypocritically exploited by the Soviet Government. This happened in late April 1986, when the Soviet Embassy in Washington excluded several USIA reporters from a press conference on those grounds. On the occasion it is satisfactory to note, the Washington press corps did protest Soviet high-handedness.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

A

CSCE FINAL ACT, 1975

The Soviet Union, together with the other signatory nations of the CSCE (Helsinki Accords), is specifically obliged to:

"... facilitate the dissemination of oral information through the encouragement of lectures and lecture tours by personalities and specialists from the other participating States, as well as exchanges of opinions at round table meetings, seminars, symposia, summer schools, congresses and other bilateral and multilateral meetings" (Part 2, section a, para. i);

"... facilitate the improvement of the dissemination, on their territory, of newspapers and printed publications, periodical and non-periodical, from the other participating States" (Part 2, section a, para. ii);

"... improve the possibilities for acquaintance with bulletins of official information issued by diplomatic missions and distributed by those missions..."(Part 2, section a, para. ii);

"... encourage the wider showing and broadcasting of a greater variety of recorded and filmed information from the other participating States, illustrating the various aspects of life in their countries..."(Part 2, section a, para. iii);

"... note the expansion in the dissemination of information broadcast by radio, and express the hope for the continuation of this process" (Part 2, section a, para. iii);

"... favor cooperation among public or private, national or international radio and television organizations, in particular through the exchange of both live and recorded radio and television programmes, and through the joint production and the broadcasting and distribution of such programmes" (Part 2, section b);

"... view favorably the possibilities of arrangements between periodical publications as well as between newspapers from the participating States, for the purpose of exchanging and publishing articles" (Part 2, section b);

"... examine in a favourable spirit and within a suitable and reasonable time scale requests from journalists for visas" (Part 2, section c);

"... grant to permanently accredited journalists of the participating States...multiple entry and exit visas for specified periods" (Part 2, section c);

"... ease, on a basis of reciprocity, procedures for arranging travel by journalists of the participating States in the country where they are exercising their profession, and to provide progressively greater opportunities for such travel..." (Part 2, section c);

"...reaffirm that the legitimate pursuit of their professional activity will neither render journalists liable to expulsion nor otherwise penalize them. If an accredited journalist is expelled, he will be informed of the reasons for this act and may submit an application for re-examination of his case" (Part 2, section c)

APPENDIX

B

TABLE 1

TOTAL SIGNIFICANT U.S.-SOVIET OFFICIAL APPEARANCES IN OPPOSITE-COUNTRY PRINT MEDIA, 1984-85*

Soviets in the American Press, October 1984 - September 1985

Washington Post	109
New York Times	80
Christian Science Monitor	15
Time	7
Totals	211

Americans in the Soviet Press, September 1984 - August 1985

Pravda	8
Izvestia	13
Trud	26
Literaturnaia Gazeta	20
Totals	67

*Explanation of USIA Methodology: 1) an "appearance" comprised "an article, an interview, a letter to the editor, an 'op-ed' piece, or a paid advertisement;" 2) "appearances" had to be at least four column inches in length; 3) for purposes of qualitative analysis, four publications from each country were deemed "representative examples of each country's press;" and 4) articles on all subjects, rather than overtly "political" subjects were included, since in the Soviet context it was "often difficult, if not impossible, to draw the line" between the two.

Source: U.S. Information Agency, Office of Research, October 16, 1985

APPENDIX

B

TABLE 2

SURVEY OF SIGNIFICANT SOVIET OFFICIAL APPEARANCES ON U.S. NETWORKS, 1983-85

Name and Position	Number of Appearances on Networks					Total Number of Appearances
	*ABC	CBS	NBC	CNN	PBS	
Alekseev, Vladimir Novosti journalist		1				1
Dobrynin, Anatolii F. Ambassador to U.S.	1	1				2
Karpov, Viktor Chief Arms Negotiator		1	1			2
Arbatov, Georgii A. Director, U.S.A. Institute	3	3	3	3		12
Gromyko, Andrei A. Former Foreign Minister				2		2
Bogachev, Vladimir Tass		1				1
Afanas'ev, Viktor G. *Pravda*		2				2
Vasil'ev, Gennadii *Pravda*		2				2
Larionova, Natasha *Pravda*		2				2
Palladin, Aleksandr *Izvestia*		3				3
Ovinnikov, Richard Deputy Representative to the U.N.		1	3			4
Shalnev, Aleksandr Tass		1				1
Adamov, Joseph Radio Moscow	3	1	10			14
Gerasimov, Gennadii Soviet TV anchorman Deputy Chairman, Novosti	6	2				8

TABLE 2 (continued)

Name and Position	ABC	CBS	NBC	CNN	PBS	Total Number of Appearances
Zamiatin, Leonid M. Chief, CPSU International Information Department		4	1	2		7
Mil'shtein, Mikhail Soviet General (Retired) U.S.A. Institute		1		1	1	3
Gramov, Marat Chairman, Sports Committee		1	1			2
Kulagin, Vladimir M. Soviet Diplomat in U.S.		1				1
Linnik, Viktor CPSU CC Consultant, *Pravda*		1				1
Gvishiani, Dzhermen Deputy Chairman, State Committee for Science and Technology		1				1
Isakov, Viktor Soviet Diplomat in U.S.		1				1
Manakov, Anatolii Journalist		1				1
Kornienko, Georgii Deputy Foreign Minister		2	1	1		4
Pozner, Vladimir Radio Moscow	15	1	3		2	21
Troianovskii, Oleg Soviet Ambassador to the U.N.		2				2
Ogarkov, Nikolai Former Chief of Staff of Soviet Armed Forces		2		2		4
Grigor'ev, Aleksandr Soviet Peace Commission		1				1
Trofimenko, Genrikh U.S.A. Institute					1	1
Menshikov, Stanislav CPSU International Department	4		2	2		8
Kochetkov, Evgenii Soviet Diplomat in U.S.		1				1
Yushkiavichius, Genrikh Vice-Chairman, Gosteleradio		1				1

TABLE 2 (continued)

Name and Position	ABC	CBS	NBC	CNN	PBS	Total Number of Appearances
Setunskii, Nikolai N.Y. Bureau Chief, Tass				2		2
Kobysh, Vitaly Section Chief, CPSU International Information Department			2	1	1	4
Zarubina, Zoia Soviet Women's Committee			1	1		2
Kapitsa, Sergei Scientist, TV show host	1		1	1		3
Kukushkin, Vsevolod Soviet sports commentator	1			1		2
Liutyi, Aleksandr Tass					1	1
Beglov, Mikhail Tass					3	3
Kelis-Berok, Vladimir Seismologist					1	1
Sagdeev, Roald Director, Space Research Institute Moscow					1	1
Kuzin, Mikhail I. Director, Moscow Surgery Institute					1	1
Velikhov, Evgenii P. Vice-President, Soviet Academy of Sciences					1	1
Il'in, Leonid A. Director, Biophysics Institute					1	1
TOTAL						138

* ABC appearances cover 1981-85

Source: U.S. Information Agency, April 4, 1986

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